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THE PROBLEMS OF THE UTILITY ANALYSIS
IN FISHER AND ITS ASSOCIATED POLICY
IMPLICATIONS AND FLAWS
SAMANTHA A. JAMESON
INTRODUCTION
Expressed sequence tags (ESTs) are short DNA sequences
containing the information to code usually a portion of a protein, and
many debate whether they should be patented.1 In In re Fisher,2 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit3 found that, despite having
several potential uses as research tools, ESTs lacked utility, which is
4
required for patentability. The court’s analysis of utility was flawed,
however, because it did not apply the traditional evidentiary
standard, misapplied its own evidentiary standard, failed to recognize
there was sufficient substantial utility as a research tool under
Brenner v. Manson,5 and altered the specific utility requirement in
detrimental ways without distinguishing or reconciling prior
precedent.
The Federal Circuit not only misconstrued the case, but its
failure to adequately address the policy implications of the decision
reveals general problems with the treatment of policy considerations
in the patent system. First, as Professor Arti K. Rai articulates, the
6
Federal Circuit appears unwilling to address policy concerns at all,
Copyright © 2006 by Samantha A. Jameson.
1. Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735,
738–39 (2000).
2. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3. The Federal Circuit hears all appeals in patent cases. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1037
(2003).
4. Id. at 1368, 1379.
5. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
6. See id. at 1123 (“[T]he Federal Circuit appears to be quite resistant to economic policy
analysis.”).
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which supports the argument that there is no institution in the current
7
patent system both willing and able to address policy. Second, the
distinction the Federal Circuit draws between ESTs of genes with
known and unknown functions is not meaningful, and illustrates that
utility makes a poor doctrinal mechanism with which to draw the
distinctions the court may be interested in, such as preventing an
8
anticommons. Third, Fisher illustrates the recurring problem of using
technology-specific rules when the court either does not understand
the science or is making unreviewable policy determinations.9 Fisher
falls at the center of many pressing policy considerations, and
provides a useful lens to analyze and support prior theories about the
consideration of policy and technology specific rules.
This Note begins in Part I by providing the necessary general
background on the utility requirement, ESTs, and DNA patents. Part
II then provides a summary of the Fisher court’s analysis of the utility
of the ESTs. The evidentiary, substantial utility, and specific utility
problems with the analysis are laid out in Part III. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the policy problems and theoretical implications of the
decision.
I. THE BACKGROUND: UTILITY AND EST HISTORY
A. The Utility Requirement Generally
Of the requirements for a patent,10 utility is the most important in
Fisher.11 Utility generally requires that the invention be “useful.”12

7. See id. at 1040–41 (“[N]o institution has taken responsibility for elaborating patent law
in the fact-specific, policy-oriented manner that the language of the statute encourages.”).
8. The anticommons concept was first articulated in Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI.
698, 698 (1998). Matthew D. Satchwell, Note, The Tao of Open Source: Minimum Action for
Maximum Gain, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1757, 1763–64 (2005).
9. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1157 (2002).
10. Patentability has five major requirements: the invention must be within a patentable
category, have utility, be nonobvious to a practitioner in the field, be novel, and be adequately
disclosed. Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene Fragments, and
Licensing the “Useful Arts,” 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 312–13 (1997).
11. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the rejection of the
claims based on lack of utility).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)). Utility is also a constitutional
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13
The threshold for utility is typically quite low. An inventor must
proffer at least one reasonable use for the invention, and, so long as
the invention can perform the function asserted for it, even if it does
14
so poorly, it may be patentable. Only those inventions “totally
incapable of achieving a useful result” or those that are inoperable
are barred from patentability by the utility standard.15
In Brenner, however, the Supreme Court articulated an elevated
utility standard for research intermediates. In that case, a chemical
process produced a product whose only known utility was as an object
of scientific inquiry.16 The Court found that a “use” as an “object of
scientific research” (an “object of use-testing”) was insufficient to
meet the utility requirement, whether the claims were to the product
or to the processes that produced it.17 A patent is not intended to be a
“hunting license”; it must relate to “commerce” rather than
18
“philosophy.” A plausible reading of Brenner characterizes this
distinction as one between basic research that must be left in the
public domain and patentable applied technology with tangible
benefits.19 In re Joly20 clarified that the utility of an intermediate could

requirement based on the mandate to promote the “useful arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
(emphasis added); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.01 (8th ed., 2d rev. 2004) [hereinafter
MPEP].
13. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 757. For example, one court said, “The threshold
of utility is not high: An invention is ‘useful’ under section 101 if it is capable of providing some
identifiable benefit.” Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
14. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 757.
15. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
16. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966).
17. See id. at 535 (“We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although
Congress intended that no patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole ‘utility’
consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to
apply to the process which yielded the unpatentable product.”).
18. Id. at 536 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
19. See Andrew T. Kight, Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility
Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1012 (1998) (“[T]he utility requirement
operates to distinguish between basic research and applied technology. In this sense, it serves a
timing function, ‘leaving basic research discoveries in the public domain until they have yielded
tangible benefits and have thereby left “the realm of philosophy” and entered “the world of
commerce.”’” (quoting Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences,
23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 6 (1995) (quoting Ruschig, 343 F.2d at 970)). A full analysis of the Brenner
decision is beyond the scope of this piece.
20. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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be shown through the utility of the final product, but simple use as an
21
intermediate was not sufficient to show utility.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Brenner rejected a “de minimis”
22
view of utility, and instead offered a new test requiring both specific
and substantial utility:23
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by
the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until
a process is refined and developed to this point—where specific
benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove
24
to be a broad field.

Although the Supreme Court has not specifically defined “specific”
and “substantial,” the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court have
25
Substantial utility, synonymous with
developed definitions.
“practical utility,” is “a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’
26
value to claimed subject matter.” It requires that an invention, in its
current form, can be used in “a manner which provides some
immediate benefit to the public.”27 A “real world” use will not exist if
28
there must be further research to identify or confirm the use.
In order to possess specific utility, “an application must disclose a
29
use which is not so vague as to be meaningless.” There must be a
“well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”30 Examples of
asserted utilities that fail on the specific utility requirement include

21. Id. at 908; Timothy A. Worrall, The 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and
DNA Patents, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 130 (2001).
22. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Fisher court’s summary of the
utility requirement is a generally good overview of the law. Justice Story’s “de minimis” view of
a “‘useful’ invention is one ‘which may be applied to a beneficial use in society, in
contradistinction to an invention injurious to the morals, health, or good order of society, or
frivolous and insignificant.’” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1966) (quoting Note on
the Patent Laws, 3 Wheat. App. 13, 24 (1818)).
23. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
24. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–35.
25. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
26. Id. (quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)) (internal quotations
omitted).
27. Id. (quoting Nelson, 626 F.2d at 856). Utility does not require that the product or
process be superior to existing products or processes. Olsen, supra note 10, at 314.
28. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372; MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
29. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
30. Id.
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“biological activity,” “biological properties,” and “technical and
31
pharmaceutical purposes.” These are so “nebulous” that they fail to
communicate an explicit indication of use for the compounds in the
32
application. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), meanwhile,
takes the view that specific utility must be “specific to the subject
matter claimed,” as opposed to the “general utility . . . applicable to
33
the broad class of the invention.” This diverges, however, from court
precedent and is less preferable than the approach taken by previous
courts.34
Although an invention must have specific utility and substantial
utility that does not require further research to confirm, it is
irrelevant to determining specific and substantial utility that an
invention is used as a research tool.35 As with any other invention, the
critical question under Brenner for research tools is whether they are
unpatentable objects of use-testing or patentable items in the “world
of commerce.”36 Despite controversy surrounding the patentability of
research tools under Brenner,37 many research tools have implicitly
been recognized to fall into the latter category because they were
38
found to be patentable. That research tools meet the Brenner

31. Id. (quoting In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
32. Id. (quoting Kirk, 376 F.2d at 941).
33. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). The Fisher court says this is consistent with its
interpretation of utility. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372.
34. Generally, the application of this standard to other technologies would be problematic
because patents on distinct but related products with similar uses would be excluded from
patentability. See infra Part III.C.
35. See MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I) (“Office personnel must distinguish between
inventions that have a specifically identified substantial utility and inventions whose asserted
utility requires further research to identify or reasonably confirm.”). The Fisher court favorably
cited and accepted this analysis. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372. A determination that an invention is a
research tool does not help determine whether the invention meets these utility standards. See
id. (“An assessment that focuses on whether an invention is useful only in a research setting
thus does not address whether the invention is in fact ‘useful’ in a patent sense.”).
36. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965,
970 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
37. Compare Justine Pila, Bound Futures: Patent Law and Modern Biotechnology, 9 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 326, 354 n.79 (2003) (expressing the view that the PTO guidelines were contrary
to Brenner in making a designation as a research tool irrelevant), with Natasha N. Aljalian, The
Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 58 n.220 (2005)
(expressing the view that a particular invention’s use as a research tool should meet the Brenner
utility requirements).
38. For example, the PTO has recognized chromatographs, screening assays, and
nucleotide sequencers are all patentable despite being research tools because they have clear,
specific, and unquestionable utilities. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
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standard is evidenced by the increase in patents covering research
39
tools.
To reject an application based on lack of utility, the patent
examiner must make a prima facie showing that it is more likely than
not that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would not consider that
any utility asserted by the applicant would be specific and
40
An applicant’s assertion of utility creates a
substantial.”
presumption that the utility is sufficient to meet the utility
41
requirement. Only if a prima facie case is made does the applicant
have the burden to provide rebuttal evidence to convince one skilled
in the art of the invention’s utility.42
B. The Molecular Biology of ESTs
The patent in In re Fisher involved expressed sequence tags
43
(ESTs). Organisms have their genetic information, or “genome,”
stored in DNA.44 The information from the DNA is copied into
mRNA, and then from mRNA into proteins, which do most of the
45
46
work in the cell. RNA is chemically distinct from DNA, and the
mRNA sequence differs from that of the original DNA because noncoding sequences in the middle of the gene’s DNA sequence are
removed.47 Researchers may then copy the mRNA sequence into
cDNA, which contains the same chemical components as DNA, but
48
has the same sequence as the mRNA. Because different cells will
39. See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 997 (2005) (noting the number of patents on biotechnology research
tools has increased substantially).
40. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.02(IV).
41. Id. § 2107.02(III).
42. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (1995) (“Only after the PTO provides evidence
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the
burden shift to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence to convince such a person of the
invention’s asserted utility.”); MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.02(VI) (“If a rejection [is] properly
imposed, . . . the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie showing.”).
43. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
44. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, at G:15 (4th ed. 2002).
45. Id. at 302, 335–36.
46. Id. at 302.
47. Id. at 317–18.
48. See id. at 503–04 (describing cDNA production to make a “library” of sequences).
cDNA is made because it is more stable and more manipulable by scientists. See Margaret
Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1237 (2000)
(“Scientists can generate stable copies of mRNA using the original DNA nucleotides (A, G, C,
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express different proteins at different times, the collection of cDNAs
49
from those cells will differ.
ESTs are lengths of cDNA that typically do not contain the
50
51
entire gene sequence. Among other uses, the ESTs can help isolate
the full gene sequence and can identify where the gene is expressed.52
These uses are based on an important property of ESTs, and all DNA
53
sequences, in binding and recognizing complementary sequences.
C. DNA Patents Prior to Fisher
Because DNA has “specific chemical structures that impart
specific properties,”54 courts treat it as a chemical for the purposes of
patentability,55 despite problems associated with the treatment of
56
DNA only as a chemical. Historically, the PTO granted patents on
and T). These condensed copies of genes, called complementary DNA (‘cDNA’), have been
crucial in the development of recombinant DNA technology.”).
49. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 503 (“Because the cells of different tissues
produce distinct sets of mRNA molecules, a distinct cDNA library is obtained for each type of
cell used to prepare the library.”).
50. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 748. The length of the EST is limited by the length
of DNA that can be sequenced at any one time, which is shorter than the length of the full gene.
Id. at 749. It is possible a short gene could be encoded by an EST, but that situation is likely to
be rare. Id.
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 749.
53. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at G:9 (“Two nucleic acid sequences are said to be
complementary if they can form a perfect base-paired double helix with each other.”); id. at 534
(describing a microarray that can be used to detect the presence sequences based on their ability
to bind their complementary sequences). In the DNA code, each base pairs with one other base:
A with T and C with G. Id. at 194. The complementary sequence has the paired base for the one
in the sequence of interest, and is in the opposite orientation. See id. at 195 (“[M]embers of each
base pair can fit together within the double helix only if . . . the polarity of one strand is oriented
opposite to that of the other strand . . . . [E]ach strand of a DNA molecule contains a sequence
of nucleotides that is exactly complementary to the nucleodite sequence of its partner strand.”).
For example, the sequence “ACTGGA” would have the complement “TCCAGT.”
54. Worrall, supra note 21, at 136.
55. See In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (treating a gene as a chemical
compound for the purposes of the written description requirement); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that “[a] gene is a chemical compound,
albeit a complex one,” and treating the gene as a chemical compound for purposes of
conception).
56. Courts have been slow to recognize the “informational link” between DNA and
protein. See Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 836 (1999) (“[The Federal Circuit failed] to
recognize DNA-based technologies as involving information first and foremost . . . . [T]o the
extent that it has acknowledged this link, the CAFC appears to be well behind the technology.”)
This is particularly clear in the nonobviousness standard, where knowing a method of
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ESTs. For example, a patent issued on ESTs from genes coding
members of a protein family with a generally known function.57 The
functions of the specific genes associated with the ESTs, however,
were not always precisely known. For example, the PTO granted a
patent for proteins secreted from cells, even though it was not known
what specifically the proteins did.58 Many EST applications were
notable because of their broad claims to an EST, the full associated
59
gene, and its future uses.
60
In response to pressure from the scientific research community,
61
62
the PTO revised its utility examination guidelines in 2001 to require
63
further characterization of the cDNAs, including ESTs. Under the
PTO’s new standards, an identification of a gene and a function are
64
sufficient to show utility. However, uses such as mapping genes,
probing for genes, and identifying chromosomes do not meet the
specific utility test, unless the associated sequence correlates with a
disease.65 Because the PTO lacks rulemaking authority, courts do not

identifying a gene and a partial protein sequence does not make the DNA sequence obvious for
purposes of patentability because the court focuses on DNA as a chemical. Id. at 833–34
(describing In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). This is problematic because a DNA
sequence may be deemed nonobvious merely because no structurally similar chemical exists,
even if the sequence was “easy or routine” to isolate based on a technical use of the
informational connection. Id. at 833–36.
57. See Human Kinase Homologs, U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (filed Aug. 7, 1996) (issued
Oct. 6, 1998) (patenting ESTs of genes encoding protein kinases); Holman & Munzer, supra
note 1, at 771 (noting proteins in the kinase family were known to be involved in signaling).
58. See Secreted Proteins and Polynucleotides Encoding Them, U.S. Patent No. 5,654,173
(filed Aug. 23, 1996) (issued Aug. 5, 1997) (patenting sequences from genes that produce
secreted proteins); Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 773 (“[W]hen the patent application was
filed, Genetics Institute apparently did not know what the secreted proteins might be.”).
59. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 104 (1999).
60. Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 840 n.111 (2001). The research
community “continues to resist broad patenting of the most upstream research.” Id.
61. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
62. The interim guidelines were issued in 1999, and the final guidelines issued in 2001. Rai,
supra note 60, at 840.
63. See Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 759 (describing a prominent PTO official’s
belief that the revision of the utility guidelines was intended to heighten the utility requirement
by requiring a characterization of the cDNA).
64. See Holman & Munzer, supra note 1, at 759 (“For example, the PTO will apparently
consider the identification of the open reading frame of a nucleic acid sequence to be sufficient,
at least in combination with the identification of a functional domain.”).
65. Id. at 760; MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). See infra Part III (discussing why this
standard is inappropriate).
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66
defer to these guidelines. They are nevertheless significant because
they establish the posture of cases that come to the courts.67 Also, the
Federal Circuit in Fisher demonstrated great willingness to accept
68
these particular guidelines.

II. THE FISHER COURT’S ANALYSIS OF UTILITY
The patent application in Fisher was for five ESTs generated
from corn leaf tissue at a particular period in development.69 The
structure and function of the underlying genes and proteins were not
70
known, but the proposed utilities of the ESTs included:
(1) serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire maize
genome, which consists of ten chromosomes that collectively
encompass roughly 50,000 genes; (2) measuring the level of mRNA
in a tissue sample via microarray technology to provide information
about gene expression; (3) providing a source for primers for use in
the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) process to enable rapid and
inexpensive duplication of specific genes; (4) identifying the
presence or absence of a polymorphism; (5) isolating promoters via
chromosome walking; (6) controlling protein expression; and (7)
71
locating genetic molecules of other plants and organisms.

The patent applicants also suggested the ESTs could be used to
screen for, identify, and characterize the underlying genes.72

66.
67.

Rai, supra note 3, at 1132.
See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 250 (3d ed. 2002) (“To the extent that the 2001 Guidelines
indicate a tightening of agency policy, the PTO will be denying more applications than it
previously would have and, as those disappointed applicants appeal to the Federal Circuit, the
agency will find itself defending its new approach in court.”).
68. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The PTO’s standards for
assessing whether a claimed invention has a specific and substantial utility comport with this
court’s interpretation of the utility requirement of § 101.”).
69. Id. at 1367–68.
70. Id. at 1368, 1373.
71. Id. at 1368.
72. See Corrected Brief for Appellants at 13, In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(No. 04-1465), available at Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O blog, http://patentlaw.
typepad.com/patent/2005/03/monsanto_asks_t.html (Mar. 23, 2005) (“[T]he claimed ESTs could
be used as research probes to screen a cDNA library for the specific gene sequence to which the
EST uniquely corresponds. The successful hybridization . . . [to the] corresponding gene
sequence would confirm that the gene was being expressed in certain tissues, at certain times, by
certain organisms.” (citation omitted)).
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Despite these assertions, the court rejected the patent, finding
73
that the ESTs lacked utility. The court wanted a showing by the
applicant that the ESTs were actually or could be used in the asserted
74
ways. The court found the application fell short under this
evidentiary standard because the asserted uses were merely
“hypothetical possibilities” any EST could achieve, but which the
75
particular ESTs in the application had not achieved.
Turning to substantial utility, the Federal Circuit analogized the
case to Brenner, in which the applicant was not allowed to claim a
76
process for preparing compounds of unknown use. The court viewed
the ESTs as only being useful as research intermediates to identify,
isolate, and experiment on the underlying genes of unknown
functions.77 Because the ESTs were employed to search for a use of
the underlying gene, there was no “immediate, well-defined, real
78
world benefit to the public.” Thus, the ESTs were seen as
unpatentable “mere ‘objects of use-testing,’” which the court defined
as an “object[] upon which scientific research could be performed
with no assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the
end.”79
The court rejected the analogy between the ESTs and the
80
microscope, a quintessentially patentable research tool. The analogy
was based on the fact that both the microscope and the ESTs can
81
generate data about a sample with unknown properties. The court,
however, found it significant that the microscope immediately reveals
the structure of a sample through magnification, while the ESTs can
only detect the presence of the genetic material with the same

73. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379.
74. See id. at 1373–74 (“Fisher has not presented any evidence . . . showing that the claimed
ESTs have been used in either way. . . . There also is no disclosure establishing that any of the
claimed ESTs were used or, for that matter, could be used to control or provide information
about gene expression.”).
75. Id. at 1373. For example, while ESTs could be used to identify promoters, the applicant
did not provide any evidence the ESTs actually identified a promoter. Id.
76. See id. at 1374 (“We agree . . . that the facts here are similar to those in Brenner . . . .
The Brenner court held that the claimed process lacked a utility because it could be used only to
produce a compound of unknown use.”).
77. Id. at 1373–74.
78. Id. at 1376.
79. Id. at 1373. It should be noted that the “assurance” of a useful discovery appears to be
an addition to the Brenner standard described in Part III.B.
80. Id. at 1373.
81. Id.
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structure, and provide no information on the structure or function of
82
the underlying gene.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the use of an
83
EST as an intermediate is not sufficient for utility. The court also
suggested that a similarity to other ESTs was insufficient to
84
demonstrate utility. Although this appears consistent with Brenner,
which held that an applicant could not show the utility of a steroid by
relying on the uses of structurally similar steroids, Brenner rested on
the recognized unpredictability of steroid compounds, a property not
inherent in ESTs.85
Next considering specific utility, the court held that the uses were
not specific because any EST from any gene has the potential to
86
perform any of the proposed uses. Under the traditional view of
specific utility, the court analogized the uses to the “nebulous” and
nonspecific assertion of “biological activity” as a use.87 The court also
accepted the PTO’s alternative formulation that required the use be
88
specific to the claimed invention, and found the ESTs did not meet
that standard since any EST would have the same uses.89

82. Id.
83. Id. at 1375.
84. First, the court noted that the steroids in Joly did not have utility even though they
were structurally similar to steroids known to be useful. Id. at 1375. Second, the court rejected
the applicants’ reliance on In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327–28 (C.C.P.A. 1980), in which the
court found untested compounds had utility based on their structural similarity to tested
compounds that were also claimed. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. The ability to rely on other ESTs to
show utility appeared to be limited to cases were the EST relied on was also claimed in the
patent, analogous to the Jolles situation as described by the Fisher court. See id. at 1377 (“Fisher
did not show that even one of the claimed ESTs had been tested and successfully aided in
identifying a polymorphism in the maize genome or in isolating a single promoter that could
give clues about protein expression.”).
85. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966) (“[D]espite the reference to the
adjacent homologue, respondent’s papers did not disclose a sufficient likelihood that the
steroid . . . would have similar tumor-inhibiting characteristics. . . . [T]he presumption that
adjacent homologues have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of ‘a
greater known unpredictability of compounds . . . .’” (footnotes omitted)).
86. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1374.
87. Id. at 1374–75.
88. Id. at 1372. The court thought the PTO’s standard was consistent with the previous
standard. See id. (“The PTO’s standards for assessing whether a claimed invention has a specific
and substantial utility comport with this court’s interpretation of the utility requirement . . . .”).
89. Id. at 1374.
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Lastly, while the court was generally uninterested in policy, it
91
did consider policy issues specifically mentioned in Brenner. Brenner
discouraged granting monopolies without utility.92 Such monopolies
had boundaries that could not be precisely delineated, and thus the
monopoly would block areas of scientific development without
benefiting the public.93 The Fisher court viewed granting a patent on
ESTs as giving an impermissible “hunting license” because the only
94
use would be to gain more information about the underlying genes.
III. WHY THE FISHER COURT’S ANALYSIS OF UTILITY
WAS INCORRECT
A. The Proposed Uses Are Sufficient Under the Traditional
Evidentiary Standard for Utility
The Fisher court did not apply the traditional evidentiary
95
standard and failed to scientifically analyze the asserted utilities. A
technical evaluation of the asserted utilities shows the assertions were
sufficient under both a traditional and an elevated evidentiary

90. See id. at 1378 (“Congress did not intend for these practical implications to affect the
determination of whether an invention satisfies the [patentability] requirements . . . . [P]ublic
policy considerations . . . are more appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative
branch . . . rather than this court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and
applying statutory law.”). The court decided the utility issue without considering the policy
concerns. See id. (“Policy reasons aside, because we conclude that the utility requirement of §
101 is not met, we hold that Fisher is not entitled to a patent for the five claimed ESTs.”).
91. See id. at 1375–76 (quoting Brenner and describing the Supreme Court’s concern with
“creating an unwarranted monopoly to the detriment of the public”). Although the Brenner
considerations appear to be policy issues, the court never described them as such.
92. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“[A] process patent in the chemical
field, which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a
monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute.”).
This portion of Brenner was quoted in Fisher. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375–76.
93. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
94. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376. While the court quoted the language on the relationship to
“commerce” and “philosophy” from Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536, the court failed to apply this
language specifically to the EST situation. One possible application would be that the ESTs
were not the ends of research related to commerce, but were tools to be used in searching for
practical utility in “the realm of philosophy.” Id.
95. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]his court . . . discounts these
ESTs because it concludes (without scientific evidence) that they do not supply enough
information.”). A technical analysis appears to be necessary to accurately determine if the uses
asserted are substantial and specific. This Part provides the technical analysis of the uses, and
Parts III.B and III.C address whether these uses are substantial and specific as technically
described.
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standard for utility, contrary to the assertion that the uses were only
96
“hypothetical.”
Traditionally, the initial burden is on the PTO to establish a
prima facie case that it is more likely than not that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not consider the utility specific and
97
substantial. There is no requirement the applicant prove the utility
with statistical certainty.98
The Fisher court, however, did not follow this standard. Rather
than find that the PTO failed to established a prima facie case
because there was no showing that the ESTs were incapable of
99
performing the asserted functions, the Fisher court shifted the
burden to the patent applicant to prove the uses100 and show they
were actual, not “hypothetical.”101 The court could not require that
every invention actually be used prior to patenting and maintain
consistency with other patent law principles.102 Thus, under the new
standard the Federal Circuit adopts here, there should be a similar
exception to that found in the “on sale” doctrine for “devices [that]
are so simple and their purpose and efficacy so obvious that their

96. Id. at 1373 (majority opinion).
97. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107(II).
98. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.02(VII).
99. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1381 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Board did not reject Fisher’s
utilities on the basis that the ESTs were unable to perform the purported utilities. Thus, the
Board did not establish a prima facie challenge to the ESTs’ ability to perform these two
utilities.”).
100. See id. at 1374 (majority opinion) (“Fisher failed to prove that its claimed ESTs can be
successfully used in the seven ways disclosed.”).
101. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. This standard is different even from In re
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967), that found “conjectural” uses were not sufficient for utility
because the examples of “conjectural” uses primarily included cases where there was no known
use. See id. at 945 (“[I]f a process for producing a product of only conjectural use is not itself
‘useful’ . . . the starting materials . . . are [not] ‘useful.’ It is not enough that the specification
disclose that the intermediate exists and . . . can be used to produce some intended product of
no known use.”).
102. For example, this would bar patents on impractical, but operable inventions, such as
producing water and oxygen from moon rocks, which traditionally have been considered
patentable. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 67, at 216 (describing Ex parte McKay, 200
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1975)) (describing that even though making water and
oxygen from moon rock is not practical on earth, utility is not typically measured by what is
practical). It could be problematic for the PTO to bar inventions that are prohibitively
expensive to practice at the time of invention, rather than letting the market determine what is
practical, because the market may be a better judge of feasibility. See id. (“[T]he claimed
inventions might have been prohibitively expensive to implement, but no one expressed doubt
as to whether the claimed methods would work . . . . [T]he PTO issues the patent and lets the
market decide the practicality of the inventions.”).
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complete construction is sufficient to demonstrate their
103
workability.” This is supported by language in Fisher suggesting that
a use one of ordinary skill would consider certain could meet the
104
elevated evidentiary standard.
Regardless of the standard adopted, at least some uses of the
ESTs should meet the evidentiary standard. Under the traditional
standard of convincing a person of ordinary skill in the art, one skilled
in the art would be convinced the ESTs could be used in the asserted
ways because “many in the research community” view ESTs as useful
105
research tools. Even if a higher standard requiring certainty is used,
at least some of the uses would not be considered hypothetical by one
106
skilled in the art. To illustrate this, it is necessary to scientifically
analyze what researchers in the field view as the uses of ESTs.107
108
Uses based on known complement binding properties of ESTs
would be recognized as certain uses. Such uses would include

103. E. Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 429, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
104. First, the court lists whether the ESTs “could be used to control or provide information
about gene expression” as an alternative to whether they were actually used. Fisher, 421 F.3d at
1374. Second, the court found there was no proof that the ESTs “can be successfully used in the
seven ways disclosed,” id. at 1374 (emphasis added), rather than continuing to insist on the
absence of actual use. Third, the court required more than “merely hypothetical possibilities,”
which would be met either by a certain ability to use the invention or an actual use. See id. at
1373 (“[A]ll of Fisher’s asserted uses represent merely hypothetical possibilities, objectives
which the claimed ESTs, or any EST for that matter, could possibly achieve, but none for which
they have been used in the real world.”). There is, however, a great deal of language
emphasizing actual uses are necessary. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, the combination of the actual use and potential to use language suggests that a
certain ability to use an invention could be sufficient to show utility.
105. Stacy Lawrence, US Court Case to Define EST Patentability, 23 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 513, 513 (2005). Many researchers, however, believe that because ESTs are
research tools, they should be left in the public domain unless they are related to a specific
process. Id. Even amici in Fisher opposed to patentability recognized the asserted uses were
nothing other “than already well-known potential uses.” Brief of Genetech, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Affirmance and Supporting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office at 13, In
re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1465), available at Posting of Dennis Crouch to
Patently-O blog, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/genentech_amicus_brief_for_in_re_
fisher.pdf (Mar. 23, 2005).
106. On the other hand, if actual use without any exceptions for certain ability to use were
required, despite the language in Fisher and inconsistency with other patent law principles and
precedent, the ESTs would likely fail on that standard if they were not actually used. See supra
notes 97–98, 102, 104 and accompanying text.
107. Although the following discussion is aimed at examining the uses under the elevated
standard, any use accepted under the elevated standard would also be accepted under the lower
traditional standard. Thus, acceptance of particular uses as research tools is not discussed under
the traditional standard unless the analysis diverges from that of the elevated standard.
108. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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“measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue sample via microarray
technology to provide information about gene expression,”
“providing a source for primers for use in the polymerase chain
reaction (‘“PCR’”) process to enable rapid and inexpensive
109
duplication of specific genes,” and screening for or identifying the
110
underlying genes. A microarray consists of several known cDNAs
that can bind cDNA made from a sample to determine which genes
111
Because ESTs can bind their matching
are expressed.
complementary sequence, one skilled in the art would know with
certainty they can be used in a microarray based on this property
alone. The ability of the EST to bind its complement also makes its
ability to identify the underlying gene or create PCR primers that
112
bind and allow amplification of the target sequence certain.
Similarly, the mapping uses of “isolating promoters via chromosome
walking” and “serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire
maize genome”113 are certain based on the same complement
sequence binding properties because ESTs are in fact used in
mapping.114
Despite these uses, not all uses in “controlling protein
expression”115 are certain. Decreasing protein expression is a more
certain use similar to designing PCR primers because complementary
sequences can be used to prevent the conversion of mRNA
109. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368.
110. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
111. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 534.
112. PCR generates many copies of a genetic sequence in a short time by heating the sample
to separate DNA strands, hybridizing primers that are sequence specific, synthesizing a
complementary strand, and repeating this process. Id. at 508–09. The primers are short DNA
sequences complementary to the ends of the sequence of which amplification is desired (the
target sequence). Id. Identification or characterization of the underlying gene could involve
PCR or microarray techniques.
113. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368.
114. See, e.g., H.-M. Ma et al., An EST Survey of the Sugarcane Transcriptome, 108
THEORETICAL & APPLIED GENETICS 851, 851 (2004) (sequencing ESTs to better understand
the sugarcane genome); Jianzhong Wu et al., A Comprehensive Rice Transcript Map Containing
6591 Expressed Sequence Tag Sites, 14 PLANT CELL 525, 525 (2002) (describing an EST map,
which can be used for further mapping efforts, of the rice genome by creating ESTs, designing
primers to the ESTs, and locating the sequences in a library). Chromosome walking uses the
complementary binding properties to determine the next portion of the genomic sequence
beyond what is known. ANTHONY J.F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC
ANALYSIS 810 (7th ed. 2000) (“[Chromosome walking is] [a] method for the dissection of large
segments of DNA, in which a cloned segment of DNA . . . is used to screen recombinant DNA
clones from the same genome bank for other clones containing neighboring sequences.”).
115. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368.
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116
information into protein. On the other hand, increasing protein
expression would likely require adding back the complete protein
sequence, which is not a certain use if the EST does not contain the
117
complete sequence.
It is almost certain that ESTs can be used in “locating genetic
molecules of other plants and organisms” or “identifying the presence
118
or absence of a polymorphism.” While it is extremely likely there
are similar genes in other organisms and polymorphisms, it is also
119
possible there are not. Thus, if the standard were that one of
ordinary skill must think the use likely, these uses would suffice. If the
standard required absolute certainty, these would fail.
The Brenner prohibition on analogies to similar chemicals to
show utility120 should not bar the considerations of the general
properties of ESTs to show the utility of the particular ESTs. In
Brenner, analogies were prohibited for steroids, in which minor
variations could result in large changes in function.121 The Court in
Brenner acknowledged that this rule might be limited to certain
122
technologies. Although the effect of a change on a steroid may be
unknown, the effect of a change in EST sequence alters only the

116. Small double-stranded RNAs can be used to prevent the production of the associated
proteins based on its ability to bind the mRNA. Craig C. Mello & Darryl Conte, Jr., Revealing
the World of RNA Interference, 431 NATURE 338, 339–40 (2004).
117. A gene can “be rather easily integrated into random positions of many animal
genomes,” including an egg cell to produce an animal carrying the gene. ALBERTS ET AL., supra
note 44, at 540–41.
118. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368.
119. Typically, genes in diverse organisms will be similar. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note
44, at 453 (“[G]enes with similar functions can be found in a diverse range of living things. . . .
[T]he actual nucleotide sequences of many genes are sufficiently well conserved that
homologous genes . . . can often be recognized across vast phylogenetic distances.”). A
polymorphism is a difference between copies of a gene in different individuals, which may or
may not be present. See id. at G:28 (“Polymorphic: Describes a gene with many different
alleles.”). If there are no polymorphisms, there could be no use of them by plant breeders to
determine heritage, which was another asserted use. Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note
72, at 18. Similarly, whether the ESTs could be used to determine the source of a tissue or
provide an understanding of the response of a tissue to various treatments, Corrected Brief for
Appellants, supra note 72, at 15, would depend on whether there are differences in expression
between tissues or treatments.
120. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
121. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966).
122. Id. (“In these circumstances and in this technical area, we would not overturn the
finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board of Appeals and not challenged by the
CCPA.”).
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123
sequence to which it will bind, a predictable change. Thus, there
should be no prohibition against relying on what is known about
general EST properties.
Because some of these uses are certain to be recognized by those
skilled in the art merely based on the properties of the “constructed”
EST, they should not be considered hypothetical.

B. The Proposed Uses Do Meet the Substantial Utility Standard
The Fisher court claimed, based on Joly and Brenner, the ESTs
lacked utility because they were mere objects of use-testing and were
just intermediates that produced a product with no known use
because the underlying genes had no known function.124 The court
failed to recognize, however, that the ESTs had uses sufficient for
substantial utility, and that their status as research tools or
intermediates should not bar their patentability.
Brenner held that a use as an “object of use-testing” was not
125
sufficient to show utility. An “object of use-testing” appears to be
an “object of scientific research,” as was the case in Brenner because
the steroid had no known use and was merely the object of “scientific
inquiry.”126 The Joly court indicated that a function as an intermediate
was similarly insufficient to show utility.127 Rather than suggesting that
intermediates were unpatentable, however, the Joly court allowed the
128
utility of an intermediate to be shown by its product.
The ESTs do not fail under Brenner and Joly for two reasons.
First, the ESTs are not objects of use-testing lacking substantial utility
because the EST itself is not an object of use-testing. Rather, the
object of study is the underlying gene or the genome. ESTs are
chemically and legally distinct from the mRNA and genomic DNA

123. The Federal Circuit held in regards to the description requirement that a protein
sequence would put one of ordinary skill in the art in possession of the entire genus of DNA
sequences that can encode the protein. In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The
court reached this conclusion even though the protein sequence does not precisely predict a
particular DNA or RNA sequence because more than one codon codes for each amino acid in
the protein. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 336. Thus, if the nucleic acid genus is predicable
from the protein sequence, the binding sequence of an EST certainly is as well because it is
perfectly predictable.
124. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
125. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535.
126. Id. at 529, 535.
127. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
128. Id.
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that they are used to study. ESTs differ from mRNA because they are
chemically DNA, and are distinct from the genomic DNA because
noncoding segments within genes and surrounding chromosomal
129
This difference is significant for
sequences are removed.
patentability because the unpurified gene is unpatentable, but the
purified EST is patentable subject matter.130 Because this distinction
from the underlying gene qualifies the EST as patentable subject
matter, it would be illogical to collapse the distinction by considering
the EST itself as an object of use-testing simply because it enables
131
research on the unpurified gene.
Second, the Fisher court’s characterization of ESTs as research
132
intermediates without analyzing the products fails to disprove utility
because, under Joly, utility may be shown by evaluating the products
of the intermediates.133 To the extent that ESTs qualify as
134
intermediates, their products have real world uses other than as
objects of use-testing.135 Genome maps produced in part from ESTs

129. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at
G:6 (cDNA is a “DNA molecule made as a copy of messenger RNA and therefore lacking the
introns that are present in genomic DNA”).
130. See Tanya Wei, Comment, Patenting Genomic Technology – 2001 Utility Examination
Guidelines: An Incomplete Remedy in Need of Prompt Reform, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307,
321–322 (2003) (“Since the sequenced gene fragments, like ESTs, do not exist in their natural
state and are therefore ‘not nature’s handiwork,’ they are ‘patentable subject matter under
§ 101.’” (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980))). Under the Parke-Davis
& Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), analysis of purification, a purified
substance is considered a “new ‘composition of matter.’” Id. at 103.
131. Even if the chemical analysis were abandoned and ESTs were viewed as identical to the
DNA or mRNA based on the same informational content, the EST is still not identical to the
entire genome it is used to map. Thus, even if the EST were an object of use-testing, its use as
an intermediate could be demonstrated under Joly by showing the map it created was useful.
132. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Just as the claimed compounds
in Kirk and Joly were useful only as intermediates in the synthesis of other compounds of
unknown use, the claimed ESTs can only be used as research intermediates in the identification
of underlying protein-encoding genes of unknown function. The rationale of Kirk and Joly thus
applies here.”).
133. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
134. The use of the ESTs in a microarray can be a direct use not dependent on
intermediaries. ESTs are generally 400 to 500 bases in length. Holman & Munzer, supra note 1,
at 749. One study compared microarray probes between 25 and 1000 bases long, and recognized
there are microarrays with cDNA probes. Cheng-Chung Chou et al., Optimization of Probe
Length and the Number of Probes per Gene for Optimal Microarray Analysis of Gene
Expression, 32 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES., 1, 7 (2004).
135. See supra Part III.A.
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are widely recognized as useful to scientists who study genes. The
PCR primers created from ESTs are useful to detect or isolate a
sequence,137 and scientists recognize the creation of constructs
decreasing protein levels as a useful tool for studying protein
138
function. Unlike the process in Brenner or the intermediate in Joly,
the EST is not used to make the underlying gene being studied
139
because that gene already exists. Thus, the ESTs should have
substantial utility because researchers use their products to study the
distinct underlying gene.
The ESTs and their products are used as research tools,140 but
status as a research tool does not alone determine the usefulness of an
141
Instead,
invention or automatically preclude patentability.
patentability depends on the existence of substantial utility, or if
further research is required to confirm the utility.142 The identified
uses of ESTs as research tools require no further research to
143
confirm. A good analogy for ESTs is nucleotide sequencers, which
have a clear and accepted utility in analyzing compounds.144 Even
though the nucleotide sequencer produces a chemical with the same
145
sequence as a portion of the gene or genome under study, the
nucleotide sequencer still has utility. The same should be true for the
ESTs.
136. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 507–08 (noting that having a genomic map
allows evolutionary relationships to be traced between genes and organisms, to discover new
genes, and to predict the function of genes).
137. Id. at 508–09.
138. See, e.g., Shenliang Wang et al., Tools For Target Identification and Validation, 8
CURRENT OPINION IN CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 371, 373–74 (2004) (describing the importance of
inhibiting a gene’s function in identifying drug targets, and the ability to “knockdown” a gene
with the introduction of RNA sequences matching those of the target gene).
139. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 520 n.1, 532 (1966) (describing the steroidproducing process that that the Court found to lack utility); In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (describing the argument that the claimed compounds were intermediates that
created compounds with a known use).
140. See supra Part III.A.
141. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
143. The dissent in Fisher considered the use of ESTs as a research tool sufficient to show
utility. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J. dissenting) (“While I
agree that an invention must demonstrate utility to satisfy § 101, these claimed ESTs have such
a utility, at least as research tools in isolating and studying other molecules.”).
144. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
145. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 505 fig. 8–36 (illustrating the process of
sequences that produces molecules with the nucleotides in the same order as the molecule being
sequenced).
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A less apt, but still relevant, analogous technology is the
microscope. While a microscope reveals the physical structure of an
unknown substance or object, the ESTs can help reveal the structure
146
of the corn genome or a gene’s function. To understand the function
of the structure seen through a microscope, further research is
typically required.147 Thus, ESTs should not be disqualified merely
because they do not immediately reveal the ultimate function of the
underlying gene.
The court in Fisher, however, draws a distinction between
research tools used to study one or a few compositions and those
148
tools used to study a potentially large number of compositions. For
the Fisher court, the ESTs differ significantly from the microscope
because they only detect material with the same sequence, which the
court claims does not provide information about the function of the
149
gene. This ignores that genetically-based research tools are useful
precisely because they detect and can be used to manipulate only the
genetic material similar to them, which is actually how researchers
gather information on the function of the genes.150 There is no
difference in the presence or absence of utility in cases of research
tools that can be used to study a single material or multiple materials;
there is only a difference in the scope of utility, which is not relevant
to patentability since only one assertion of utility is required.151

146. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Both [the microscope and ESTs]
advance research and bring scientists closer to unlocking the secrets of the corn genome to
provide better food production for the hungry world.”).
147. Id. For example, cancerous cells can be identified under a microscope, but further
research is required to grasp why the cancer spreads and understand the compounds that
interact with the cancer. Id. at 1380–81. The use of ESTs is clear because they “have already
been used to advance cancer research well beyond what is achievable using microscopes alone.”
Id. at 1381 n.1.
148. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373 (“[A] microscope has the specific benefit of optically
magnifying an object to immediately reveal its structure. One of the claimed ESTs, by contrast,
can only be used to detect the presence of genetic material having the same structure as the EST
itself.”).
149. Id. The MPEP also states there is no utility in “assaying for or identifying a material
that has no specific and/or substantial utility.” MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
150. For example, analyzing gene expression can provide some indication of a gene’s
function. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 44, at 536. Decreasing, increasing, or altering either the
time or location of protein expression further aid in identifying the function of the gene. Id.
Some of the uses of ESTs, such as in microarrays or PCR, do allow for the study of a gene’s
function in these ways. See supra Part III.A.
151. Also, there is no indication that the Fisher court’s distinction tracks the division
between inventions with an identified utility and those that require further research to confirm.
See supra Part III.A.
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The Fisher court’s treatment of objects of use testing and
research tools is inconsistent with Brenner because the Fisher court
inappropriately attempted to alter the definition of object of usetesting provided by the Supreme Court. In Brenner, the Court defined
an “object of use-testing” as something that was itself an “object of
scientific research.”152 The Federal Circuit impermissibly redefined
the Supreme Court’s standard for an “object of use-testing” as an
“object[] upon which scientific research could be performed with no
assurance that anything useful will be discovered in the end.”153 If
patents were not allowed on inventions that lack an “assurance that
anything useful will be discovered at the end,” patents would be
unavailable for many important research tools because of the
154
uncertainty inherent in most research. Thus, although it is not
certain what ESTs and nucleotide sequencers will discover, neither is
itself an object of study and both are used to study an underlying gene
or genome.155 Thus, the ESTs in Fisher should not have failed for lack
of substantial utility.
C. The Proposed Uses Meet the Specific Utility Standard
Just as the ESTs have substantial utility, they also have specific
utility. Specific utility appears to have multiple meanings, one defined
previously by the courts and the other adopted by the PTO and
accepted in Fisher. The standard previously adopted by the courts

152. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). For example, in Brenner, the steroid was
an object of use-testing because its only use was as an object of research. See supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
153. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373. This is consistent with other cases where the Federal Circuit
has disregarded the Supreme Court’s determinations. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) (“The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of
Warner-Jenkinson [a Supreme Court decision], which instructed that courts must be cautious
before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.”
(describing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997))); J. Jason
Lang, Comment, The German Resolution: A Proposed Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis and a
Flexible Rule of Prosecution History Estoppel for Biotechnology, 52 EMORY L.J. 427, 486 (2003)
(“[T]he Federal Circuit dogmatically invokes the triple-identity test, ignoring Supreme Court’s
counsel and the test’s obvious unsuitability for biotechnology.”).
154. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“These criticisms would foreclose
much scientific research and many vital research tools. Often scientists embark on research with
no assurance of success and knowing that even success will demand ‘significant additional
research.’”).
155. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I)
(recognizing that nucleotide sequencers are patentable, despite being research tools, because
they have clear, specific, and substantial utilities).
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should be used because of the problems in applying the Fisher
standard to other technological fields.
Courts initially defined specific utility as requiring that “an
application must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be
156
meaningless.” The primary example of a use “so general as to be
157
meaningless” was “biological properties.” It was a “nebulous”
expression that did not convey a “more explicit indication of the
usefulness of the compounds and how to use them . . . .”158 This
standard requires distinguishing between situations where a use is
disclosed and those where the application fails to specify “why [the
invention] is considered useful”159 or only “vaguely intimate[s]” the
160
use.
The application in Fisher meets this definition of specific utility
because the proffered uses were sufficiently precise that one skilled in
161
the art would know how the invention could be used. The
application expressly identified the particular biological properties
and their applications, which sufficiently demonstrates specific
utility.162
The PTO asserted a different standard, however, which the
163
Fisher court adopted with no extended analysis, despite deviating
164
significantly from previous case law. Under this standard, specific
utility must be “specific to the subject matter claimed,” as opposed to

156. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
157. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 940 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
158. Id.
159. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
160. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
161. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.
162. The uses are not too general because while all chemicals have some biological property,
not all chemicals have the uses asserted in Fisher. For example, a use as a chromosome marker
or gene probe appear to be clear assertions of utility.
163. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (accepting the PTO’s standard
merely by saying it is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of utility).
164. The MPEP fails to cite any support for the PTO’s interpretation of specific utility.
MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I). The only case cited in the relevant section, Knapp v.
Anderson, 477 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A 1973), supports the proposition that “[a] general statement of
diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient
absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed,” especially if a useful invention could
arise from the claimed invention. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I); see Knapp, 477 F.2d at
590–91 (finding no reduction to practice because laboratory testing was insufficient to show the
invention could be used in the asserted ways). This is consistent with the Federal Circuit
ignoring policy issues and instead accepting the decisions of the PTO on significant patentability
matters. See infra Part IV.A.
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165
the general utility applicable to the broad class of inventions. This
differs from the prior standard that did not suggest the use must be
exclusive to the invention, only that it must be clear.166 The PTO
particularly asserts that a use as a “gene probe” or a “chromosome
marker” is not sufficient, but is instead analogous to claiming
“biological properties.”167
Because patent law is typically technology neutral,168 this
standard would presumably apply generally, which would be
problematic. For example, multiple patents protect steroids appearing
to have a common general structural formula and that are all claimed
to act as anti-inflammatories.169 If only specific properties not
applicable to the class were considered for utility, perhaps these
patents on steroids would be barred by the PTO’s standard as well.
While this presents problems for technological fields, the PTO’s
specific utility standard also appears inconsistent with the suggestion
in Brenner that if the steroids could have been shown to have the
same properties as the homologue, they would be patentable.170
Thus, because the PTO’s standard is problematic when applied
to other technologies and is inconsistent with previous case law, the
original standard developed by courts should have been used to find
the ESTs have specific utility.

IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF FISHER
A. Policy, Institutional Roles and Competence, and Fisher
The actions of the Fisher court support the assertions of
Professor Rai that no institution in the patent system adequately

165. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
166. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
167. MPEP, supra note 12, § 2107.01(I).
168. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1156.
169. See, e.g., Steroid Compounds, U.S. Patent No. 5,116,829 (filed April 10, 1991) (issued
May 26, 1992); Soft Steroids Having Anti-Inflammatory Activity, U.S. Patent No. 4,710,495
(filed April 8, 1985) (issued Dec. 1, 1987).
170. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 522, 532 (1966) (noting that the steroids in the
class with the claimed compound under investigation had potential tumor-inhibiting effects, and
accepting the PTO’s determination that there was insufficient evidence of such effect from the
claimed compound).
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171
deals with policy issues. Congress has delegated the power to
develop the patent statute through policy elaboration to the courts,172
but the Federal Circuit in Fisher refused to consider public policy
173
because it believed the task fell to Congress. This refusal to consider
policy is consistent with the broader observation that the Federal
Circuit’s opinions display a general disinterest in both economics and
174
policy.
Because neither the Congress nor the Federal Circuit appear
willing to consider policy, this leaves the PTO to make policy by
175
issuing guidelines interpreting the patent statute, as was the case in
176
Fisher. Because the Federal Circuit in Fisher followed these
177
guidelines without extended analysis, even though the guidelines do
not receive formal deference from courts,178 the PTO became the de
facto policy maker. This is problematic, however, because the PTO
179
may not be competent to make economic and policy decisions.
Thus, Fisher illustrates the patent system’s institutional difficulties in
dealing with policy issues.

B. The Absence of a Meaningful Distinction Between ESTs of Genes
With and Without Known Functions, and the Problems with the
Use of Utility in Trying to Create One
The poor policy choices made in Fisher illustrate the inability of
institutions in the patent system to adequately address policy issues.
For example, the court’s distinction between ESTs for genes of
known and unknown functions180 is not a principled distinction. This

171. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1040–41 (“[N]o institution has taken responsibility for
elaborating patent law in the fact-specific, policy-oriented manner that the language of the
statute encourages.”).
172. Id. at 1102.
173. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
174. Rai, supra note 3, at 1073 (“After all, the court’s opinions as a whole appear to betray
little interest in economic or policy analysis.”).
175. Id. at 1131.
176. See, e.g., supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
177. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372.
178. Rai, supra note 3, at 1132. The PTO does not have substantive rulemaking authority,
which means its guidelines interpreting the patent statute do not receive judicial deference. Id.
179. Id. For example, the PTO does not employ economists and has an institutional culture
that treats potential patentees as clients to be served rather than claimants needing to prove
they deserve a patent. Id. at 1133. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C for a discussion of the
problems with the analysis ultimately adopted by the court consistent with the PTO’s policy.
180. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1375.
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attempted division also illustrates the problems with using utility to
draw the desired policy distinctions.
Fisher does not make a principled distinction because ESTs of
genes with and without known functions are used in much the same
181
182
way. The primary uses of the ESTs are as research tools, and they
are used to study what is unknown about the underlying genes,
regardless of whether or not the gene’s central function is known.
Given this, there may be more utility in ESTs for genes without
183
known functions and properties. ESTs of genes without known
functions will provide researchers with even more information about
the underlying gene because even the general function will be
learnable. The dissent notes the majority may have made a value
judgment that ESTs do not produce “enough valuable information.”184
The majority’s approach is problematic because science proceeds in
incremental steps and the majority lacks a sufficient “scientific
foundation” to make its determination.185
Similarly, no policy distinctions exist between ESTs of genes with
known or unknown functions based on Brenner’s reasoning. The
Brenner Court wanted to avoid granting a monopoly if the bounds of
186
the monopoly were not precisely delineated. It is not clear,
however, why the bounds of a patent would be significantly less
defined if the genes underlying the ESTs lacked a known function,
particularly because the bounds of a patent are not defined by

181. See, e.g., EGVIII Endoglucanase and Nucleic Acids Encoding the Same, U.S. Patent
No. 7,049,125 (filed Dec. 18, 2001) (issued May 23, 2006) (describing the use of a gene to
identify and study similar genes in other organisms); Salicylic Acid Biosynthetic Genes and Uses
Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 7,070,772 (filed July 18, 2001) (issued July 4, 2006) (providing uses for
the gene including creating PCR primers and controlling protein expression).
182. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
183. Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note 72, at 39–40.
184. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting). If this were the majority’s basis for the
decision, the criticism would apply equally well to ESTs with and without known functions
because the uses for ESTs with and without known functions are essentially the same.
185. Id.
186. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“[W]e believe a more compelling
consideration is that a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and
pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be
granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until the process claim has been reduced to
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not
capable of precise delineation. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this
point . . . there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove
to be a broad field.”).
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187

utility. Moreover, Brenner only requires that courts avoid granting a
monopoly over inventions with no utility,188 which is irrelevant to
determining whether ESTs have utility in the first place.
Also, ESTs are unlike a “hunting license”189 in the way likely
intended by the Brenner Court. Because ESTs are tools to be used
rather than mere discoveries, they are “commerce” rather than
“philosophy.”190 There is no continuing search for a use for the ESTs
because the uses are already known. “Search” cannot refer to a
search using the patented product as a tool, as the Fisher court
interprets it,191 because this would bar the patentability of all research
tools, at least some of which have clearly been patentable.192
Even though the Fisher court did not address the impact of EST
patents on the anticommons, these concerns also fail to provide a
basis upon which to distinguish between patents on ESTs of genes
with known and those with unknown functions. A “tragedy of the
anticommons” occurs when a resource is underused because multiple
owners “have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no
one has an effective privilege of use.”193 In the EST context, this leads
to concerns that multiple overlapping patents on the same underlying
gene or protein will issue, and all of them would need to be cleared

187. See Melissa E. Horn, Note, DNA Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the
Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 279 (2003) (“[O]ne utility
description is enough to get a patent that covers all of a gene’s functions . . . .”). It was also
recognized in another opinion in Brenner that “advance knowledge of a specific product use
[does not] provide much safeguard on this score or fix ‘metes and bounds’ precisely since a
hundred more uses may be found after a patent is granted and greatly enhance its value.”
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 537 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–35 (majority opinion).
189. Id. at 536.
190. See id. at 536 (“‘[A] patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather
than to the realm of philosophy . . . .’” (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A.
1965))). Although there is some question as to the literal commercial success of the ESTs, this
should be largely irrelevant to Brenner’s distinction. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370, 1377
(describing the patentee’s claim to the commercial success of the ESTs and the courts’
determination that commercial success was irrelevant since evidence was not presented).
191. Despite the application’s asserted uses for ESTs as research tools, see supra Part III.A
& III.B, the Fisher court nonetheless found that “[t]he claimed ESTs themselves are not an end
of Fisher's research effort, but only tools to be used along the way in the search for a practical
utility.” Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1376.
192. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
193. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998).
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194
prior to performing research. Even without multiple patents on a
single gene, uses, such as microarrays, that require large numbers of
genes to be effective would still encounter anticommons problems.
Because there would be many patents on upstream research, the
patents could completely “strangle downstream product development
in a morass of required licenses”195 and block groups of researchers
196
197
from the patented ESTs, or at least drive up research costs.
Rather than fulfilling the Constitutional goal of patents in promoting
progress,198 such patents could “discourage research, delay scientific
199
discovery, and thwart progress in the ‘useful Arts’ and ‘Science.’”
Because “progress” depends on using research tools, patents on ESTs
could stifle future innovation by preventing the creation of another
200
patentable invention.
If the Federal Circuit’s goal was to avoid some of these problems
the distinction between ESTs with and without known functions does
not significantly aid in that effort. Regardless of whether a function
must be shown, different companies will still own patents on ESTs,
which could create an anticommons. Even if a function requirement
could ensure there would be only one patent per gene, researchers
developing technologies requiring multiple genes would still have
difficulties coordinating licenses. While a requirement to show a
function could possibly delay patenting and allow for the creation of
more prior art, this would not necessarily dissuade individuals from

194. Debora Robertson, EST Patent Granted for Human Kinase Homologs, 17 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 125, 125 (1999) (“Jack Tribble, head of Merck’s (Wilmington, DE)
biotechnology patent group, points out another problem. ‘If there are multiple patents on ESTs
within a well-known gene, one may require license for [all] those ESTs so you can use the fulllength gene,’ he says.”).
195. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1195–96.
196. Debora Robertson, EST Patent Granted for Human Kinase Homologs, 17 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 125, 125 (1999).
197. Olsen, supra note 10, at 323.
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
199. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (presenting the government’s
argument that ESTs without utility would discourage research and discovery) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
200. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 123 (2004) (“[W]hen research tools are patented . . .
[progress] usually depends upon using an embodiment of the invention—the research tool
itself—to make a further, and often patentable, innovation. . . . The concern with patented
research tools arises from the fear that a research tool may give the tool inventor the ability to
block technological progress by controlling the research that may be performed using the
tool . . . .”).
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seeking patents. To avoid anticipating disclosures, greater secrecy
201
could be employed until a sufficient function was discovered. This
could result in both a less cooperative scientific community202 and
203
wasteful duplication of efforts. Thus, distinguishing between ESTs
of genes with known and unknown functions does not avoid an
anticommons, and it produces other problems.
The central problem is that the utility doctrine is not well
adapted to draw the relevant policy distinctions desired.204 It may be
advantageous to exclude inexpensive and easy to develop research
tools, such as ESTs, from patentability because patents would create
high transactions costs and costs to creativity.205 On the other hand, it
could be detrimental to exclude research tools that are expensive and
time-consuming to create, such as certain types of genetically
engineered mice,206 which require incentives to develop and the
transaction and creativity costs are low. Thus, a desirable doctrine
should be able to exclude ESTs, but allow some genetically
engineered mice. The utility standard, however, is incapable of
accomplishing this because it applies generally to all inventions
without consideration of the difficulty in creating the invention,

201. See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law,
Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J.
187, 227, 238–39 (2002) (explaining policies of a university laboratory collaborating with
industry to delay disclosure, particularly through publication, until a patent application can be
filed and an expectation by the university of contractual restrictions on disclosure).
202. The ideal conditions for facilitating science are “[p]erfect interconnectivity and open
access,” which greater secrecy due to patents or the desire for credit can hinder. Jim Chen,
Biodiversity and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 66
(2005). Patents under a low utility requirement system at least allow for safe disclosure by
scientists after filing the patent application, even if researchers are still excluded from their use.
See Newberg & Dunn, supra note 201, at 227, 238–39 (describing delay of disclosure, not failing
to disclose, to the scientific community in the current system).
203. Patents allow firms “to signal each other, thus reducing the amount of duplicative
investment in innovation.” Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265, 278 (1977). If secrecy increases, a competing firm would wastefully expend
efforts researching the invention when it had already been discovered. Id.
204. Although Professor Rai notes that the utility analysis could be used as a proxy for a
complicated economic analysis, Rai, supra note 59, at 141, the Fisher court claims to be
uninterested in this type of policy analysis, Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378. Regardless, it is difficult to
understand why the Federal Circuit would contradict precedent without some policy motivation.
Thus, the Federal Circuit may be performing a complicated economic analysis, unaided and
unchecked, in the guise of adhering to precedent.
205. Rai, supra note 59, at 140–41.
206. Id. at 141.
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207
transaction costs, or creativity costs. Therefore, other limits on
patentability, such as nonobviousness, may better draw the distinction
because they can address these issues and preclude, rather than
208
merely delay, the patent.

C. Problems with and Explanations of the Technology-Specific Rules
Without any overt consideration of technology-specific policy,
the Fisher court appears to have applied sub silentio a different
standard for utility that may apply only to this specific technology and
that is not well suited to address the relevant policy considerations.209
In this way, Fisher illustrates the problems in unguided technologyspecific rules and potential explanations for these problems.
Theoretically, the patent system “provides technology-neutral
protection to all kinds of technologies” with flexible standards
210
designed to apply to a wide assortment of technologies. Professors
Burk and Lemley note, however, that technology-specific standards
211
do exist through different applications of the same rule. In
biotechnology generally, they found a low nonobviousness standard,
but a stricter enablement and written description requirement than in
other disciplines.212 They explain that the “person having ordinary
skill in the art” (PHOSITA) in biotechnology is assumed by the
courts to know little about his or her field.213
Thus, the Fisher case is not novel in applying divergent
technology-specific rules, and at least the court’s altered evidentiary
standard214 can be explained under the PHOSITA theory. If the
Federal Circuit assumed that biotechnology practitioners know little
about their field,215 the Federal Circuit would require more proof than
would actually be necessary to convince today’s biotechnology

207. Id.
208. See infra note 231.
209. See supra Part IV.B.
210. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1156.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 1157, 1192–93 (“The court seems to believe that biotechnology is as much a
black art as a science, where the result of experimentation is largely out of the skilled artisan’s
hands.”). The more skill those in the art have, the less information an applicant has to disclose
in order to meet the enablement requirement, but the harder it is to meet the nonobviousness
requirement. Id. at 1156.
214. See supra Part III.A.
215. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1156.
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practitioner of the uses of ESTs. Although the PHOSITA standard
may provide the necessary flexibility for patent law to apply to
216
different technologies, the level of skill in biotechnology appears to
217
have been set at an earlier time and has not changed with the field.
This is a problem because the decisions do not accurately reflect the
realities of the industry, making the rules adopted inappropriate for
218
the industry in which they are specifically applied.
Nevertheless, the PHOSITA standard does not explain the larger
change in specific and substantial utility for biotechnology because
219
PHOSITAs are not a part of the remainder of the utility analysis.
There are two probable, coexisting explanations for the
biotechnology-specific utility standard. First, the Federal Circuit may
not understand the technology. This is a likely explanation because
the technical knowledge of the Federal Circuit is limited to the
training of the individuals within it, who could not possibly be
technically trained in all the necessary areas in which cases arise.220
The court’s failure to engage in a technical analysis of utility
221
illustrates this point. This possibility is troublesome because it
suggests that the Federal Circuit bases its judgments on its own
beliefs about the field rather than an analysis of the actual case, and
thus making an incorrect result likely.
222
Second, despite claiming a lack of interest in policy, the Federal
Circuit could be attempting to create a separate standard for
biotechnology to meet its special needs by deliberately manipulating
the doctrine.223 If the court is motivated by policy yet does not
articulate its policy rationales, it precludes the development of

216. Id. at 1157.
217. Id.
218. See id. (“[W]e believe the courts must take more care than they currently do to ensure
that their assessments of patent validity are rooted in understandings of the technology that
were accurate at the time the invention was made.”).
219. Moreover, the utility standard has no explicit technology-specific aspect like the
PHOSITA. Thus, the utility standard is particularly ill-suited to become a technology-specific
standard because it is expected to apply generally. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying
text. The Fisher court’s utility standard is described as technology-specific because the court
may never apply the standard outside DNA sequence patents or biotechnology, particularly
because the application of this standard in other areas would result in problems. See supra notes
168–70 and accompanying text.
220. Rai, supra note 3, at 1068–69.
221. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
222. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (majority opinion).
223. Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1194–95.
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224

coherent patent policy in the case law and stymies the evaluation of
patent policy by other institutions.225 This is of particular concern
when the courts can be mistaken about the policy needs of the
industry, as Professors Burk and Lemley have observed in the
biotechnology context.226 It would be further disconcerting to have a
court disavow interest in policy matters,227 and then make policybased decisions.
To make appropriate technology-specific standards suited to the
needs of the field, there must be an accurate analysis both of the field
and of the relevant policy, neither of which was present in Fisher. To
228
explain the absence of technical analysis and the departure from
229
precedent for no explicit reason, it appears most likely the court
attempted to draw a technology-specific standard without articulating
the policy basis and misunderstood the technology.
CONCLUSION
The use of the utility standard is unnecessary because there are
several alternatives to limit the patentability of ESTs. For example,
Congress could decide to alter patent laws or create a separate system
of rights from patent to address the special needs of biotechnology.230
Alternatively, the courts could alter the nonobviousness standard to
better reflect the current needs of biotechnology.231
Nevertheless, the Fisher court chose to use the utility standard to
try to exclude certain EST patents. The application of the utility

224. Rai, supra note 3, at 1073.
225. Cf. id. at 1125 (suggesting that review by other courts would cause the Federal Circuit
to address persuasive policy arguments in its opinions).
226. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1195 (noting the Federal Circuit’s approach to
biotechnology was likely to cause an anticommons).
227. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
228. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
230. Olsen, supra note 10, at 331–33.
231. The nonobviousness requirement appears better suited to exclude ESTs, but not other
valuable inventions, because it considers whether “a patentable invention represent[s] an
advance over the prior art that would not have been obvious to someone of ‘ordinary skill in the
art.’” Rai, supra note 59, at 107; In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J.,
dissenting). However, In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1158–59 (Fed. Cir. 1995), which found a protein
sequence and a method of cloning a gene were not sufficient to make the sequence obvious,
would need to be overturned. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting)
(“Unfortunately this court has deprived the Patent Office of the obviousness requirement for
genomic inventions.”).
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standard to draw a distinction between ESTs of genes with known
and unknown functions had no basis in policy. Further, the analysis of
the utility standard was flawed in its use of the evidentiary standard,
substantial utility, and specific utility. Finally, the flawed analysis in
the Fisher case supports the theory that the patent system has no
adequate institution to deal with policy, and provides insight into the
nature of technology-specific rules. Thus, regardless of whether the
court reached the right result in denying the patent in this particular
case, the reasoning behind this decision was problematic and may
prove detrimental.

